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Abstract
When scientists seek further confirmation of their results, they often attempt
to duplicate the results using diverse means. To the extent that they are suc-
cessful in doing so, their results are said to be robust. This paper investigates
the logic of such “robustness analysis” [RA]. The most important and chal-
lenging question an account of RA can answer is what sense of evidential
diversity is involved in RAs. I argue that prevailing formal explications of
such diversity are unsatisfactory. I propose a unified, explanatory account
of diversity in RAs. The resulting account is, I argue, truer to actual cases of
RA in science; moreover, this account affords us a helpful, new foothold on
the logic undergirding RAs.
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1 Robustness Analysis in Science
In 1827, the botanist Robert Brown focused his microscope on a sample of pollen gran-
ules suspended in water. His aim was to get a better glimpse at the unique form of
these particular granules, but his attention was instead drawn to their surprising mo-
tion, “consisting not only of a change of place in the fluid, manifested by alterations
in their relative positions, but also not unfrequently of a change of form in the particle
itself” ([1827], pp. 466-67). After confirming that the motions were not simply due to
currents or evaporation of the water, Brown hypothesized that the motion was character-
istic of the Clarkia pulchella pollen he was observing, this having an unusually large size
and cylindrical shape. However, he quickly ruled out this idea when, placing the pollen
of several other plants under the same conditions, Brown noted that “in all these plants
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particles were found, [...] varied in form from oblong to spherical, having manifest mo-
tions similar to those already described.” Through a series of other experiments, Brown
tested various other potential explanations of the perceived motion (e.g., sexual drive
inherent in pollen) and, continuing to observe the motion in each case, dismissed these
ideas as well. For Brown, this process culminated in experiments detecting the same
motion using various inorganic materials (including “a fragment of the Sphinx”!), thus
disconfirming the idea that vital forces caused the motion. Brown concludes, “in every
mineral which I could reduce to a powder, sufficiently fine to be temporarily suspended
in water, I found these [moving] molecules more or less copiously” (p. 472).
In the following decades, physicists continued to explore the phenomenon of “Brow-
nian motion”. Additional experiments ruled out further hypotheses, revealing that the
motion persisted in spite of changes to the container used, medium used, means of sus-
pending the particles, lighting and general environmental conditions surrounding the
experiment, etc. Circa 1900, this same motion had been detected in such a diverse vari-
ety of ways, proving robust across changes to a host of experimental conditions, that the
phenomenon’s robustness itself called out for analysis.
Eventually, almost 80 years after Brown first puzzled over the movements of his
pollen granules, Einstein’s 1905 work on molecular theory and thermodynamics pro-
vided the missing link, making sense of Brownian motion. The robustness of the Brown-
ian motion pointed to the deeper, unobservable agitations of molecules constituting the
medium – just as the evident rocking of a far off ship betrays imperceptibly distant waves
on the sea (Perrin [1913], p. 83). As Perrin summarized, after reviewing the history of ex-
periments testing the robustness of Brownian motion, “All of these characteristics force
us to conclude [...] that the agitation does not originate either in the particles themselves
or in any cause external to the liquid, but must be attributed to internal movements,
characteristic of the fluid state” (Perrin [1913], p. 86).
This case exemplifies a general style of reasoning common across the sciences and
much discussed in recent philosophy of science. To the extent that a scientific result is
detected by numerous, diverse means, it is said to be robust. We can analyze the robust-
ness of a particular result by exploring the differences in past means of detection that
have had no (or a negligible) effect on the result – and also by exploring variations that
have made a difference to the result. By performing such robustness analysis [henceforth,
“RA”], we are often seemingly able to construct or confirm relevant scientific hypothe-
ses. Regarding the above case, the Brownian motion is robust across various changes
to the experimental apparatus (type of particle, medium, container, lighting) and sensi-
tive to others (size of particle, temperature of medium). And it is upon analyzing such
facts that Perrin says we are “forced to conclude,” consistent with Einstein’s molecular
explanation, that there are internal, unobservable movements in the medium.
Robustness analyses are useful to science outside of the laboratory too; by “results”
and “means of detection,” I don’t mean only to refer to experimental results and exper-
iments. On the contrary, I mean these terms to be quite generic, so that the results in
question could be observations, measurements, predictions, theorems, and so on. Cor-
respondingly, the means of detecting such results could include experiments, laboratory
instruments, sensory modalities, derivations (from axioms, models, theories, etc.), ax-
iomatic systems, computer simulations, and formal models amongst other things. So
understood, there are any number of example RAs from past and present scientific prac-
tice. These include the following cases discussed by philosophers of science:
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Physics: In addition to the RA of Brownian motion already discussed, Perrin ([1913]) ar-
gues for the existence of atoms by noting that Avagadro’s number is robust across
thirteen distinct means of measurement (Cartwright [1991]; Salmon [1984]; Mayo
[1996]). Hacking ([1983]) asserts that we lend further confirmation to the reality
of microscopic phenomena when that phenomena is robustly observed through
different types of microscope. See also Staley’s ([2004]) discussion of RA’s role in
the discovery of the top quark.
Biological experiments: Culp ([1994]) discusses historical research on the bacterial meso-
some, a “bag-shaped membranous structure” revealed in early electron micro-
graphs. Scientists confirmed that mesosomes are artifactual when experiments
showed that the presence of mesosomes depends on how a sample is prepared;
i.e., mesosomes were not observed robustly across experiments using different
sample preparation methods.
Psychology: Stolarz-Fantino et al. ([2003]) and Crupi et al. ([2008]) cite the “robustness,”
across diverse experimental setups, of the judgment that a conjunction is more
likely than one of its conjuncts in order to argue for the reality of the conjunction
fallacy.
Biological models: Weisberg and Reisman ([2008]) note that the Volterra Principle (“ce-
teris paribus, if a two-species, predator-prey system is negatively coupled, then a
general biocide will increase the abundance of the prey and decrease the abun-
dance of predators”) is robustly demonstrable across a variety of biological mod-
els, which differ in their simplifying assumptions. See also (Plutynski [2006]) for a
discussion of RA in population genetics.
Climate science: Lloyd ([2010], p. 982) points to 14 different models used to simulate
global climate. All of these models agree in that they include increases in green-
house gas concentration as a “key causal factor” to global warming patterns. Lloyd
argues that this allows us to “infer that greenhouse gas concentration increases
cause global warming in the real world” – cf., (Parker [2011]). Pirtle et al. ([2010],
p. 353) performed “a rough survey of the contents of six leading climate journals
since 1990” and “found 118 articles in which the authors relied on the concept of
agreement between models to inspire confidence in their results.”
Economics Kuorikoski et al. ([2010]) and Odenbaugh and Alexandrova ([2011]) discuss
work in which theoretical economists analyze the robustness of results derived
from models differing in their idealizing assumptions. Kuorikoski et al. argue that
the robustness of such results “guards us from error” by showing that the com-
mon results we get across such models “do not depend on particular falsehoods.”
Alternatively, Odenbaugh and Alexandrova argue that RAs have importance only
in the context of discovery – not in contexts of theory justification.
One might roughly categorize the above into two groups, the first three being more
empirically-driven and the latter three more analytically or model-driven. This would be
consonant with a recent trend in philosophy of science. Breaking with the unifying focus
on RAs in general that one finds, for example, in Wimsatt’s work, many philosophers of
science have found it useful to focus specifically on particular varieties of RA, allowing
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them to examine potential idiosyncrasies of each type.1 In this paper, however, I make
a return to the general perspective and propose an account, which I claim unifies these
types.
In more detail, the remainder of this paper provides a half critical, half constructive
investigation into RA. The most important and challenging question an account of RA
can answer is what it takes for various means of detection to be appropriately diverse. In
Section 2, I argue that the prevailing formal explications of such diversity are unsatisfac-
tory. Section 3 proposes a new unified account of RAs. At the heart of this account is an
explanatory explication of what it takes for the relevant means of detection to be diverse.
The result is, I suggest, truer to actual scientific RAs. Moreover, as I will argue with the
help of some recent formal work on the “logic of explanatory power,” this explanatory
account affords us a helpful, new foothold on the logic undergirding RAs.
2 RA-Diversity and Independence
The most well-known early discussion of RA comes not from a philosopher of science,
but from population biologist Richard Levins ([1966]). In a discussion of the various
complications that confront biologists who use simplified models to study complex sys-
tems, Levins raises the daunting problem of how to decipher whether a result “depends
on the essentials of a model or on the details of the simplifying assumptions." In this
context, Levins ([1966], p. 423) famously proposes RA as a solution:
[W]e attempt to treat the same problem with several alternative models each
with different simplifications but with a common biological assumption.
Then, if these models, despite their different assumptions, lead to similar
results we have what we can call a robust theorem which is relatively free of
the details of the model. Hence our truth is the intersection of independent
lies.
Here, the common result is the similar behavior across various models – both Levins
and Weisberg ([2006], [2013]) mention the similar qualitative behavior of predator-prey
models interpreted as representing the Volterra Principle as an example. The diverse
means which detect (i.e., entail) this result are the models themselves. Fitting with the
informal characterization of RA that we have given, Levins notes that we may confirm
that our theorem “depends on the essentials of a model” to the extent that it robustly
follows from diverse models.
This brings us to the heart of the matter. The intuition underlying RA is that we can
gain confirmation through diversity; certain hypotheses (e.g., the Volterra Principle) are
supported to the extent that a result proves robust, and results are robust to the extent
that we detect them in diverse ways. As Weisberg ([2013], p. 160) writes, “the key is to
ensure that a sufficiently heterogeneous set of situations is covered in the set of models
subjected to [RA].” But what precise sense of diversity is involved in RAs? What does it
take for a set of situations to be “sufficiently heterogeneous”?
1For example, Woodward ([2006]) distinguishes four and Calcott ([2011]) three different types
of RA. By contrast, Wimsatt ([2011], p. 299) clarifies that the aim of his earlier work on the topic
was “to show the common features of these diverse methods.”
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Philosophers have offered various accounts of evidential diversity. And many of
these accounts plausibly capture legitimate senses in which we speak of evidence as
being diverse. But is there a single sense of diversity that drives our reasoning in RAs?
Any proposed account of such “RA-diversity” can be held accountable both to sci-
entific practice and to our normative intuitions. Ideally, we would like a precise account
that reveals the extent to which (and conditions under which) RA-diverse means of de-
tection are able to lend confirmation to the relevant hypothesis. But such an account will
not illuminate RA if it relies on a notion of diversity that does not fit with actual cases of
RA in science. Such an account may shed light on the confirmational import of certain
diverse bodies of evidence, just not on RA-diverse evidence.
In the remainder of this section, I apply this consideration in criticizing the most
common formal approaches to explicating diversity in RAs. These Bayesian accounts
model diversity using probabilistically-precise notions of independence. Moreover, sev-
eral of these accounts imply interesting senses in which diverse bodies of evidence may
be specially confirmatory. The problem is that these accounts fail to capture many clear
– even paradigmatic – cases of RA from science. To show this in each case, I return to
the above examples of RAs in science – especially making use of the cases of Brownian
motion and the Volterra Principle.
2.1 Unconditional probabilistic independence
So what precisely is meant, in RAs, when we say that the various means of detection are
diverse? As a first attempt at answering this question, we might take a cue from Levins’s
quote and surmise that some precise notion of “independence” is at work. Most simply,
one might say that if two means of detection are RA-diverse in the relevant sense, then
they are (unconditionally) probabilistically independent of one another.
To make this idea more precise, let R be a proposition describing the result that
has been robustly detected by various means. Then, let us denote the proposition that
this result is detected using the k’th means of detection as Rk. According to the simple
(unconditional) probabilistic independence account, if two means of detection are RA-
diverse, then the fact that R is detected via means i should have no bearing whatever on
the probability that R will be detected using means j: Pr(Ri&Rj) = Pr(Ri)⇥ Pr(Rj) –
which (assuming that Pr(Ri), Pr(Rj) > 0) entails that Pr(Ri) = Pr(Ri|Rj) and Pr(Rj) =
Pr(Rj|Ri).2
In their critique of Levins’s discussion of RA, Orzack and Sober ([1993], pp. 539-40;
cf., Justus [2012], pp. 798-99) consider and quickly dismiss this explication; they ar-
gue that, by requiring the various models to share “a common biological assumption,”
Levins’s “‘Protocol’ for the discovery of robust predictions guarantees that the models
under consideration are not independent.”3 In more detail and put more explicitly in
Bayesian terms, when such a model implies a particular result in RA settings, we con-
2For clarity and ease of exposition, I leave the background beliefs term implicit in all Bayesian
formulae.
3Orzack and Sober also criticize an alternative explication according to which two models are
diverse only if they are logically independent. The fact that RA-diverse models may involve con-
trary simplifying assumptions spells trouble for this account; e.g., “A model with the assumption
of random mating is not logically independent of a model with the assumption that mating is
assortative; the reason is that the truth of one entails the falsity of the other.”
5
sider it possible (and often even plausible) that the result is driven by the “essential core”
of the model – i.e., Levins’s common biological assumption(s). But then whether or not
we get a result from one of the models will manifestly provide relevant information with
regards to whether we will get the result from another model with the same common
core. Typically, the fact that we have “detected” R with one such model (i.e., the fact
that R is implied by one model) will increase the probability that we will detect R using
another: Pr(Ri) < Pr(Ri|Rj). Importantly, this may be true despite the fact that these
models are considered diverse for the sake of RA.
For similar reasons, RA-diverse experiments in the case of Brownian motion also
fail to be unconditionally independent. Take any two of these experiments, say those
suspending dust particles in water and those suspending them in ethanol. Although
these are diverse in the relevant sense that makes it appropriate for scientists, like Perrin,
to cite them as part of their RA, the respective results of these experiments may inform
one another. This will be the case, in fact, so long as one allows that other factors (besides
whether to use water or ethanol as the medium) may potentially influence whether one
observes the result. These experiments actually share in common the vast majority of
their respective traits – type of particle used, means of suspending the particle, lighting
conditions, etc. – which may all be seen as potentially relevant in affecting the result. But
then, observations of Brownian movements in water may greatly increase the probability
that one will observe Brownian movements in ethanol. In this case again, perfectly RA-
diverse means of detection may be such that Pr(Ri) < Pr(Ri|Rj).
2.2 Reliability independence
While this initial effort thus fails, there are subtler ways one can attempt to use proba-
bilistic independence to explicate RA-diversity. Wimsatt ([1994], p. 197) offers such an
account, proposing “that the probability of failure of the different means of access should
be independent.” This account arguably doubles as a more accurate interpretation of
Levins’s thought that RA requires “independent lies.” The lies, the ways that each means
of detection could lead us astray, are the things that are required to be independent be-
tween RA-diverse means of detection.4
This reliability independence account differs from the simple account above. Instead of
enforcing the overly stringent condition that the results of the various means of detection
be probabilistically irrelevant to one another, this account just requires that if the means
in question lead us astray in adopting some hypothesis, they do so for probabilistically
independent reasons. Hence, learning that one of our means of detection has misled us
has no effect on the probability that the other means of detection will mislead us. Each
means of detection is or isn’t reliable, independent of the others.
One nice feature of this account is the straightforward way in which it reveals the
epistemic appeal of diversity. The justification that a hypothesis receives from evidence
that is diverse in this sense has all the logical advantage of webs over chains. Whereas a
linear chain of justification can be no stronger than its weakest link, a web of independent
lines of justification is no weaker than its strongest member. Wimsatt ([1981], pp. 49-
50) offers a quick probabilistic demonstration of this as follows: Assume that we have
4Bovens and Hartmann ([2003], pp. 96-97) offer an in-depth formal exploration of this notion
of evidential diversity, and Kuorikoski et al. ([2010], pp. 544-45) follow Wimsatt in adopting this
account as an explication of RA-diversity.
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n means, all of which detect a result. Now assume that these means are reliability
independent. Naturally, these means are imperfect, and so each may lead us astray with
some probability; for simplicity, assume that they each may lead us astray with the same
probability p0. Now, if the common result these means are all giving us is incorrect,
then all n means of detection are going astray. Because they do so independently of one
another, we know that the probability of this happening is pp = pn0 . Wimsatt concludes,
“But p0 is presumably always less than 1; thus, for n > 1, pp is always less than p0.
Adding alternatives for redundancy always increases reliability.”
Unfortunately, while reliability independence clearly explicates an important notion
of evidential diversity, it too will not do as a general explication of RA-diversity. Return
to the example of Brownian motion. In this case, to say that an experiment is unreli-
able, or leading us astray, amounts to saying that it is misleading us in concluding with
Perrin that there are internal, unobservable movements in the medium. Now consider
again two of the RA-diverse means of detection (i.e., experiments) used by Brown: those
in which a variety of pollen granules were suspended in water, and those in which a
variety of inorganic materials were suspended in water. These experiments are cited by
Perrin and others as diverse in the sense required for RA. Yet, credences about their
respective reliabilities surely have a bearing on one another. To be sure, they could
be unreliable for different reasons. But there are any number of common reasons that
they might be unreliable too – both could be misleading us due to the way the particles
are being suspended, due to the use of the same medium, due to the use of the same
environmental conditions surrounding the apparatus, etc. But then learning that one
of these experiments is leading us astray provides relevant information when deciding
whether to trust the other. In particular, such information often should greatly reduce
our confidence in the other’s reliability.
This account faces the same problem with examples from modeling. In our example
from biology, predator-prey models may be said to be unreliable to the extent that they
mislead us in concluding that the Volterra Principle holds – e.g., if a model demonstrates
behavior interpreted in accordance with this principle, but only because of some non-
representative, artifactual assumption built into the model. Two RA-diverse predator-
prey models that behave in accordance with the Volterra Principle may differ only on
whether they involve a particular simplifying assumption, say the assumption that prey
capture rate increases linearly with number of predators. A model that is more realistic
in this one regard and the fully simplified model will share many potential sources of
unreliability when it comes to modeling the complex predator-prey dynamics (e.g., the
unrealistic assumption that prey cannot take cover or learn). But then discovering that
one of the models is unreliable should often greatly increase our confidence that the other
is too. In general, fully RA-diverse means of detection can nonetheless be susceptible to
many of the same potential confounds; in such cases, learning that one of our means of
detection is unreliable will often greatly increase the likeliness that other of our means
of detection are similarly unreliable.
2.3 Confirmational and conditional independence
Lloyd ([2009], [2010]) has recently proposed another independence-based account. She
proposes that RA-diversity amounts to confirmational independence, as explicated by Fitel-
son ([2001]). This sense is defined relative to a target hypothesis (call it H), which we
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may think of as the hypothesis intuitively supported via the RA. Two means of detection
are RA-diverse, according to this account, only if their results incrementally confirm /
disconfirm H (raise / lower H’s probability) to the same extent regardless of whether we
have detected the results using the other means. More formally (using the notation we
introduced in Section 2.1 above, and where c stands in for an adopted Bayesian measure
of incremental confirmation): if the i’th and j’th means of detection are RA-diverse with
respect to H, then c(H,Ri|Rj) = c(H,Ri) and c(H,Rj|Ri) = c(H,Rj).5
As with Wimsatt’s account of evidential diversity, this idea nicely illuminates the
normative appeal of diversifying our evidence. Accepting any of the most defensible and
popular Bayesian measures of confirmation as c, and assuming that each detection of R
individually confirms H to some extent, one can prove that confirmationally independent
means of detection jointly confirm H to a greater extent than either means of detection
does individually: c(H,Ri&Rj) > c(H,Ri) and c(H,Ri&Rj) > c(H,Rj) (Fitelson, [2001],
p. S131).
Before evaluating this account, it is worth mentioning that confirmational indepen-
dence has a direct connection to conditional probabilistic independence, relative to H.
As Fitelson ([2001], p. S129) clarifies, “screening-off by H of Ri from Rj is a suffi-
cient condition for Ri and Rj to be mutually confirmationally independent regarding
H.”6 By “screening-off,” Fitelson has in mind the standard Reichenbachian ([1956],
pp. 158-59) notion, implying the dual conditional independencies: Pr(Ri&Rj|H) =
Pr(Ri|H)⇥ Pr(Rj|H) and Pr(Ri&Rj|¬H) = Pr(Ri|¬H)⇥ Pr(Rj|¬H).
Unfortunately, confirmational independence also does not fit with the notion of RA-
diversity. Consider again two experiments from the Brownian motion case. Let R1 de-
scribe the fact that we have observed Brownian motion using the uniquely shaped and
sized pollen granules of Clarkia pulchella, and let R2 be the proposition that we have wit-
nessed the same motions using other types of pollen. While these two results are diverse
in the sense that makes them crucial to establishing the robustness of Brownian motion
(and both mentioned explicitly as such by Perrin), they are evidently not confirmation-
ally independent regarding H: Perrin’s inferred hypothesis that there are unobservable
movements internal to fluid media. To assert that they are would be to claim that his
hypothesis is supported to the same extent by R1, regardless of whether we know R2.
But while H may be strongly supported by experiments observing the jostling of gran-
ules of a particular type of pollen, it plausibly does not gain nearly so much support
from such an observation if one has already witnessed the jostling using several other
types of pollen: c(H,R1|R2) < c(H,R1). On the contrary, the more pollens that we have
already observed in motion, the less a confirmatory impact on H future experiments
using pollens will have.
The following observation helps us to see why this account does not work from an-
other angle. The fact that these diverse means of detection are not confirmationally inde-
pendent regarding H implies that their results also will not be screened-off by H. Here,
we can pinpoint the feature of screening-off that generally will not be satisfied by these
experiments, the clause that asserts that R1 and R2 should be independent conditional
5Notation: c(x, y) measures the degree of confirmation that y lends to x; c(x, y|z) measures the
degree of confirmation that y lends to x, conditional on (or given that) z.
6I have replaced Fitelson’s notation with our own. It should be noted that Fitelson suggests
this relation as a condition of adequacy on measures of confirmation, as opposed to proving and
presenting it as a theorem that follows robustly (!) for all candidate measures.
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on ¬H: Pr(R1&R2|¬H) = Pr(R1|¬H) ⇥ Pr(R2|¬H). If H is false, there remain many
potential reasons why we might see particles dance about in fluids. Take for example the
idea H0 that this motion is due to the nature of the suspended particle. Conditional on
H0, the observation of Brownian motion using various pollens will greatly increase the
probability of witnessing it in other pollens: Pr(R1|H0) ⌧ Pr(R1|H0&R2). After all, on
this hypothesis, this motion is attributable to some aspect of the suspended particle; but
then witnessing it across samples of pollen will make us more confident that all pollens
share the relevant attribute (e.g., the sexual drive or vital force inherent in the parti-
cles). More generally, given that H is false, we might still observe R according to several
alternative possibilities. And RA-diverse means of detecting R can be probabilistically
relevant to one another conditional on these other possibilities.
Similar points weigh against the idea that confirmational or conditional indepen-
dence explicates RA-diversity in cases from modeling. For example, conditional on the
Volterra Principle being false – i.e., if it’s not true, all else being equal, that a general
biocide will increase the abundance of the prey and decrease the abundance of preda-
tors when a two-species, predator-prey system is negatively coupled – there could be
several reasons for why our models are displaying qualitative behavior interpreted in
accordance with this principle. Perhaps this behavior is somehow an artifact of the un-
realistic assumption that prey are borne at a single constant rate. Conditional on the
hypothesis that this partially drives our result, two RA-diverse models that both assume
single growth rates for prey (e.g., two models differing only on whether they represent
predator satiation) may be substantially probabilistically relevant to one another; if one
provides the result, this may greatly increase the probability that the other will too.
2.4 Partial independence?
One might think that the problem is just that we have framed the above accounts as
requiring full unconditional, reliability, or confirmational independence. Perhaps we
can make these accounts more defensible by adjusting them to measure degrees of RA-
diversity. Two means of detection are RA-diverse, we might say, to the extent that they
approach full unconditional (or reliability, or confirmational) independence. Wimsatt
([1981], p. 46) may have just this sort of move in mind when he writes, “All these
procedures require at least partial independence of the various processes across which
invariance is shown.”
I submit, however, that the criticisms above remain powerful even if we develop these
accounts in this way. The problem is not that the RA-diverse means of detection in these
paradigmatic cases fall just short of full independence in one of the three senses. On
the contrary, in certain such cases, means of detection that are recognizably and clearly
RA-diverse may not even come remotely close to being independent in any of the above
three senses. Nor is it at all clear that we would end up with means of detection that
are more RA-diverse if we sought those that came closer to full unconditional, reliability,
or confirmational independence. In the foregoing examples, the means of detection are
intuitively fully diverse in the sense required for them to do their work in RA. When
Perrin cites experiments detecting Brownian motion using organic particles, and then
those using inorganic particles, there is a sense in which these means of detection are
perfectly diverse in the way required to have their respective roles in Perrin’s larger RA.
And there is no clear reason to think that Perrin’s cited means could have been improved
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in their RA-diversity roles had they been less dependent.
3 Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning
In light of the last section, one might be tempted to conclude that there is no single,
unified notion of RA-diversity. In RAs, we require our means of detection to be diverse,
and this ambiguous requirement may be satisfied – one might say – to the extent that
they are diverse in any of the above senses. Perhaps. But in the remainder of this
paper, I try out a different sort of unified account of RA-diversity. It seems to me that
philosophers working on RA have been lured away from the concept of RA-diversity by
probabilistic independence; while this formal concept has been so fruitful in explicating
notions of evidential diversity, I have argued that none of these notions of evidential
diversity are the sort at work in RAs. The account developed here thus parts ways
from independence-based accounts of evidential diversity, and instead has as its central
notions explanation and elimination.7
3.1 Explanatorily discriminating means of detection
To motivate this account, it helps to work backwards, first thinking about what is ac-
complished in successful RAs by introducing diverse means of detection, and only then
investigating the sense of diversity required to pull this off. It will again help to have in
mind, as particular examples, Perrin’s more experimentally-driven RA from Brownian
motion to the hypothesis H that there are unobservable, “internal movements, charac-
teristic of the fluid state” and a model-based RA supporting the Volterra Principle.
What work are the means of detection cited by Perrin supposed to accomplish by
virtue of their diversity? What deficiencies would Perrin’s RA have suffered if, for ex-
ample, he had rested his case after reporting only that Brown observed various pollen
granules in motion when suspended in water? The obvious answer is that, had Perrin
stopped there, there would have too many competing potential explanations of the ob-
served motion standing in the way of this conclusion. One would hardly be compelled
to infer H from this single observation; Brown certainly was not. There were too many
other hypotheses left standing at this stage for H (or any of H’s competitors) to be well-
supported by the result. So, instead of stopping there, Perrin mentions experiment after
experiment detecting the result, which differ from one another insofar as they are able
to eliminate different sets of H’s competitors.
Similarly, a single mathematical model behaving in accordance with the Volterra
Principle could hardly be said to lend strong support for this general biological principle.
There are too many ways that any such model parts ways from the real world scenarios
that it is trying to represent. The behavior of the model could be driven by any subset
of the necessary idealizing and simplifying assumptions that we know fail to represent
the real world. To rule out such competing explanations of the model’s behavior, a
variety of other models are thus employed, which likewise attempt to model behavior in
7The eliminative account of evidential diversity developed by Horwich ([1982], pp. 118-22) is a
precursor to the present account. In (Schupbach [Forthcoming]), I discuss Horwich’s account and
its shortcomings as an explication of RA-diversity in detail.
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accordance with the Volterra Principle but differ from one another on which simplifying
and idealizing assumptions they involve.
As a first pass then, my proposal is that each newly cited detection in such cases
RA-differs from previous means of detection if it is capable of ruling out another class
of competing potential explanations of the result left standing by these previous means.
In the case of the Volterra Principle, this amounts to showing model-by-model that the
behavior of interest is not driven by various unrealistic assumptions. In the experimen-
tal case, in response to Brown’s initial detection, H’s critic asserts, “Well, perhaps this
motion is really explained by the sexual drive inherent in pollen.” So Perrin cites experi-
ments showing that Brownian movements persist in other (organic) materials. “But per-
haps the motion is due to a vital force in the material suspended.” Perrin responds with
experiments using inorganic materials. The imaginary dialectic proceeds until Perrin has
cited experiments ruling out a host of competing explanations of the phenomenon. And
it is only at the end of this process that Perrin says we are “forced to conclude” that H is
correct.
The lessons we learn from these specific cases are generally applicable to all standard
cases of RA – whether more empirically or analytically-driven. In any case, we can
ask: What motivates us to seek and cite additional means of detection in an RA? What
work are these additional means doing for us? The general account I am proposing
responds that, at each increment of a RA, one cites an additional means of detection that
has the power to discriminate between the target explanation of the result H and some
competing potential explanation(s) H0. More specifically, such means of detection are
explanatorily discriminating between H and H0 in the sense that H would explain well our
detecting result R via this new means, whereas H0 would explain well our failing to detect
R by this means.
Perrin’s hypothesis that the Brownian motion is due to internal, invisible movements
in the medium would explain well our observations of such motion using inorganic ma-
terial, whereas the vital force hypothesis would explain well our failing to observe the
result in this case; thus, this experimental detection explanatorily discriminates between
these hypotheses. That a biological model behaves in accordance with the Volterra Princi-
ple while not making the unrealistic assumption that prey cannot take cover is explained
well by the Volterra Principle itself (in conjunction with the hypothesis that the model is
accurately modeling the real world behavior of predator-prey systems), but the compet-
ing explanation that this behavior is attributable to the unrealistic assumption in question
would rather provide a strong explanation of our failing to observe the behavior using
such a model; such a model thus explanatorily discriminates between these potential
explanations.
The notion of explanatory discrimination provides us with a general (though still
informal) way of characterizing RA-diversity:
RA-Diversity. Means of detecting R are RA-diverse with respect to potential explanation
(target hypothesis) H and its competitors to the extent that their detections (R1,
R2, ..., Rn) can be put into a sequence for which any member is explanatorily
discriminating between H and some competing explanation(s) not yet ruled out
by the prior members of that sequence.
In short, RA-diverse means of detection provide sequences of explanatorily discriminat-
ing bits of evidence, which successively eliminate more and more of H’s competitors.
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Importantly, on this account, it is really not so relevant whether means of detection
are strongly diverse or sufficiently heterogeneous in some absolute sense, independent
of considered hypotheses. What matters for RA-diversity is that the means (which may
actually be quite similar in most respects) are different in just the sense required to rule
out the target hypothesis’s salient competitors.8
As such, this account makes better sense of standard cases of RA in science. Many
of the RA-diverse means of detecting Brownian motion cited by Perrin are really just
not that different, and similarly for many of the predator-prey models used in the case
of the Volterra Principle. Indeed, these means may be identical in all respects other
than some modest change – e.g., in Perrin’s case, in the particle suspended or mode
of suspending it. This is why accounts that require RA-diverse means to be strongly
different (often in a sense that pays no attention to the relevant hypotheses) run quickly
into counterexamples in these cases.
Such means of detection are clearly explanatorily discriminating, however. When
Perrin cites experiments on Clarkia pulchella, and then increments the RA by citing ex-
periments on other varieties of pollen, he is not doing so because these experiments
are strongly different than one another in some absolute sense, but because they are
relevantly different than one another. The latter rules out a potential explanation left
standing by the first – viz., that the motion is attributable to the unique form of Clarkia
pulchella granules.
Similarly, when seeking to confirm the Volterra Principle, RA-diverse models may
be quite similar apart from some modest differences in their simplifying assumptions.
But by utilizing these distinct (though perhaps overall quite similar) models, we may
eliminate confounding explanations of our result left standing by either model used
alone. As noted above, we may discard worries that our result is an artifact of a particular
unrealistic assumption of the first model by using a second model that does not share
that assumption.
Recall from Section 2 that there are two dimensions on which we might evaluate any
proposed account of RA-diversity: fit with scientific practice and normative implications.
I have just argued that the above explanatory account is truer to standard scientific cases
of RA. But how does this account fare with regards to the second evaluative dimension?
Is this account informative with regards to whether, under what conditions, and to what
extent, RA is specially confirmatory? One might worry that the proposal, in virtue
of its explanatory nature, is too vague to be of any normative service – that it trades
off normative upshot for descriptive power. The remainder of this paper attempts to
alleviate this worry. Recent work on the logic of explanatory power enables us to specify
precise normative implications of RA-diverse (i.e., explanatorily discriminating) means
of detection, and RAs generally.
3.2 The logic of robustness analysis
The intuition motivating any increment of a RA is that we can strengthen the case for our
favored H by detecting our result using different means. Using our explanatory account
8This is not to say that the present account requires means of detection to be overall very similar
to one another in some absolute sense; overall very different means of detection may of course be
explanatorily discriminating with respect to H and its competitors.
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of RA-diversity, we may clarify the following conditions for a successful increment of
RA:
Past Detections. We have a result R that we have detected using n  1 different means.
Let E denote the relevant conjunction R1&R2&...&Rn 1.
Success. Hypothesis H (the hypothesis that we seek to confirm by our RA) explains this
coincidence, but so does another hypothesis (or class of hypotheses) H0.
Competition. H and H0 compete with one another, with respect to E.
Discrimination. There is an additional explanatorily discriminating (apropos H and H0)
means of potentially detecting R; i.e., in light of E, H would strongly explain our
detecting R via this n’th means (Rn), whereas H0 would strongly explain our not
detecting R by this means (¬Rn).
New Detection. The new means of detection concurs with prior means; i.e., Rn.
To explore the normative implications of RA, we first need to get more precise about
some of the above conditions. First, consider Competition. What exactly does it take for
two potential explanations H and H0 to compete with one another?9 The first thing to
note is that there are deep, ontic senses in which hypotheses compete, but we are rather
interested in the question of when hypotheses compete in our epistemic economy. In RAs,
we consider hypotheses to be epistemic competitors in the sense that reason compels us
to infer at most one of these; such epistemically competing hypotheses may or may not
be competing in a deeper, ontic sense.
To see this important distinction, consider the most obvious sense in which hypothe-
ses may compete: they may be mutually exclusive. While mutually exclusive hypotheses
clearly compete ontically, they may or may not compete epistemically. The logical incon-
sistencies by virtue of which these hypotheses preclude one another may be tucked so
subtly away into the fabric of the respective hypotheses, or the logical demonstration of
such inconsistencies may be so computationally complex, that no rational person need
recognize them. In other words, in principle, reason may not always oblige us to choose
between jointly unsatisfiable hypotheses. Nonetheless, if an agent does recognize that two
hypotheses are inconsistent, then that recognition will serve as reason compelling the agent
to infer at most one of the hypotheses. So, where probabilities measure rational degrees
of belief, we get the following epistemicized version of the mutual exclusivity sense of
competition:
Competition (i). H and H0 compete epistemically if Pr(H&H0) = 0.10
Is this sufficient condition for epistemic competition also necessary? In fact, no; it
is easy to think of cases in which reason compels us to accept at most one of several
potential explanations, despite the fact that they are recognizably consistent. There is no
inconsistency in allowing that Brownian motion could simultaneously result from un-
observable movements in fluid media and a vital force in organic matter. Nonetheless,
9Glass and Schupbach ([Unpublished]) offer a far more detailed account of hypothesis com-
petition along these same lines—including a probabilistic explication of the degree to which hy-
potheses compete.
10We are assuming here and throughout that Pr(H), Pr(H0) > 0, given that H and its competitors
in the context of RAs are sufficiently plausible to worthy of consideration as potential explanations
of R. Note that this assumption entails that when Pr(H&H0) = 0, these two hypotheses truly
compete in the sense of precluding one another; the fact that their joint probability is zero is not
due simply to the fact that H or H0 takes probability zero on its own.
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these hypotheses are viewed as epistemic competitors. An explication of epistemic com-
petition that appeals to inconsistency will not then shed light on the sort of competition
at work in all RAs.
Potential explanations of some explanandum E often compete, despite being consis-
tent, when any one of these suffices to do the explanatory work of the others. Once we
have accepted one, the explanatory work in accounting for E is done and hence there
is no remaining explanatory reason from E to accept the others.11 Perrin’s hypothesis
and its competitors compete in this way. If we favor Perrin’s potential explanation of
Brownian motion, then it would seem misguided to additionally accept the vital force
hypothesis as another explanation. The phenomenon is already explained, so the ex-
planandum no longer compels us to hunt for, and reason to, further explanations. In
this case, the evidence compels us to accept at most one of the alternatives (which is
precisely what we mean by epistemic competition). So we may clarify our second sense
of epistemic competition as follows:
Competition (ii). H and H0 epistemically compete in their potential explanations of E if
H and H0 both potentially explain E, but upon accepting H0, H no longer retains
any explanatory power over E.
Success, Competition (ii), and Discrimination explicitly involve explanatory con-
siderations. To make the logical implications of these conditions more precise, we can
make use of recent work on the “logic of explanatory power”. Schupbach and Sprenger
([2011]) recently develop and defend the following probabilistic measure of “the explana-
tory power that a particular explanans [h] has over explanandum [e]:”12
E(e, h) = Pr(h|e)  Pr(h|¬e)
Pr(h|e) + Pr(h|¬e)
E(e, h) is a real-valued function with range [ 1, 1]. The greater the value of E(e, h), the
stronger (more powerful) the potential explanation of e that h proffers. When E(e, h) = 1,
11An anonymous reviewer helpfully observes that, depending on one’s account of explanatory
goodness, there may remain explanatory reason apart from E still supporting such hypotheses.
For example, if a notion of simplicity – defined as a monadic property of hypotheses – counts
toward explanatory goodness, then it may be that we no longer have explanatory reason from E
for accepting a potential explanation, though we still have some explanatory reason apart from E
for accepting this explanation (due to its great simplicity). The important point here is that, even if
this is the case, the explanandum E itself will still only compel us to choose one of the hypotheses;
insofar as we are inclined to go ahead and choose the other, it would be due for example to its
simplicity and not to any support it retains from E.
12Probabilistic measures of explanatory power go back to Popper ([1959]) and Good ([1960]).
More recently, in addition to Schupbach and Sprenger, McGrew ([2003]) and Crupi and Tentori
([2012]) propose candidate measures. All of these measures are explicitly meant to gauge the
strength of the explanatory relation between an explanans and explanandum. While it is beyond
the scope of the present paper to argue for measure E ’s special merits, the interested reader may
refer to (Schupbach and Sprenger [2011]), which argues that this measure uniquely satisfies a set of
intuitive conditions of adequacy related to the concept of explanatory power, and to (Schupbach
[2011]), which demonstrates experimentally that this measure provides a close fit with our pre-
formal intuitive judgments about explanatory power – at least in the tested, experimental contexts.
Though I work directly with E , all of the substantive results derived using this measure in this
paper also hold using any of the alternative measures defended in the works cited above.
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h provides a maximally powerful potential explanation of e, meaning that h suffices to
account for (or predict) e with certainty. When E(e, h) =  1, h provides a minimally
powerful (maximally weak) potential explanation of e, meaning that h suffices to account
for ¬e with certainty. Finally, when E(e, h) = 0, h is said to be explanatorily irrelevant to
e, meaning that h accounts for e just as well as it accounts for ¬e.
To explicate Success, Competition (ii), and Discrimination using E , we formalize
the judgment that h (potentially) explains e as a positive degree of explanatory power
(E(e, h) > 0), and we formalize the judgment that h strongly (potentially) explains e as
near-maximal degree of explanatory power (E(e, h) ⇡ 1). Statements about degree of
explanatory power “in light of” or “upon accepting” some proposition p are naturally
explicated using the following notion of conditional degree of explanatory power:
E(e, h|p) = Pr(h|e&p)  Pr(h|¬e&p)
Pr(h|e&p) + Pr(h|¬e&p)
With the ideas of explanatory power and epistemic competition made more precise,
we may now restate the conditions for a successful increment of RA formally:
Past Detections. We are given that R1&R2&...&Rn 1; i.e., E
Success. E(E,H), E(E,H0) > 0
Competition. (i) Pr(H&H0) = 0, or (ii) E(E,H|H0)  0
Discrimination. E(Rn,H|E), E(¬Rn,H0|E) ⇡ 1
New Detection. We learn that Rn
We are now in a position to investigate the normative import of a successful increment
of RA. Below, I distinguish two cases for investigation, corresponding to the two senses
in which hypotheses may epistemically compete.
3.2.1 Mutually exclusive competitors
Assume that H and H0 compete in the sense of being recognized as mutually exclusive.
In this case, we can partition the space of possibilities into the set {H,H0,C}, where C
is a catch-all hypothesis – logically equivalent to ¬(H _ H0). To gauge the epistemic
import of an increment of RA, we compare Pr(H|E&Rn) and Pr(H|E) in order to clarify
the conditions under which the former term might be greater than the latter, and what
determines the extent of this inequality. We may use the above partition to expand
Pr(H|E&Rn) and Pr(H|E) using Bayes’s Theorem and then compare the two by dividing





Pr(H)Pr(E|H) + Pr(H0)Pr(E|H0) + Pr(C)Pr(E|C)
Pr(H)Pr(E&Rn|H) + Pr(H0)Pr(E&Rn|H0) + Pr(C)Pr(E&Rn|C)
Given that our n’th means of detecting R is explanatorily discriminating (as
stipulated byDiscrimination), we know that E(Rn,H|E) ⇡ 1 and E(¬Rn,H0|E) ⇡
1. When coupled with Success, these considerations entail Pr(Rn|H&E) ⇡ 1 and
Pr(Rn|H0&E) ⇡ 0 respectively (proof in Appendix A).13 From Pr(Rn|H0&E) ⇡ 0,
we know that Pr(E&Rn|H0) = Pr(E|H0)Pr(Rn|H0&E) ⇡ 0. These likelihoods
13Note that these likelihoods intuitively fit standard cases of RA. E.g., it is highly likely (indeed,
nearly certain), that we should witness the Brownian motion using fragments of the Sphinx (under
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accordingly reflect the intuition that explanatorily discriminating evidence that










Pr(H)Pr(E|H) + Pr(H0)Pr(E|H0) + Pr(C)Pr(E|C)
Pr(H)Pr(E&Rn|H) + Pr(C)Pr(E&Rn|C)
Pr(Rn|H&E) ⇡ 1 reflects the idea that H accounts so well for our robustly de-
tecting R using this n’th means. Given this likelihood, we can show Pr(E&Rn|H) =




Pr(H)Pr(E|H) + Pr(H0)Pr(E|H0) + Pr(C)Pr(E|C)
Pr(H)Pr(E|H) + Pr(C)Pr(E&Rn|C) (1)
Comparing like terms between the denominator and numerator of the right hand
side of (1) (and remembering that the axioms of probability entail Pr(E&Rn|C) 
Pr(E|C)), we see that this ratio must be top heavy. Thus, in these circumstances,
Pr(H|E&Rn) > Pr(H|E); a successful increment of RA will indeed confirm (in-
crease the probability of) target hypothesis H to some extent.
What determines the extent? Examining the right hand side of (1) again,
observe that the numerator of this ratio is greater than the denominator at least by
a difference of Pr(H0)Pr(E|H0). On the one hand, H0’s prior probability Pr(H0)
measures how plausible H’s competitor was to begin with. On the other hand,
Pr(E|H0) roughly measures competitor H0’s fit with the evidence, prior to its
being ruled out with the addition of Rn. These factors, considered together,
provide an estimate of H0’s overall epistemic virtue pre-elimination. So how
good was H0 (both on its own and in relation to E) before Rn? The answer to
this question tells us how much better off (at least) H is now that we’ve ruled H0
out. One might say that target hypothesis H soaks up the epistemic virtue that
H0 had going for it prior to being eliminated; spoils to the victor.
3.2.2 Consistent epistemic competitors
When H and its competitors are mutually exclusive, a successful increment of
RA provides confirmation for H by ruling out certain ways in which H could
be false. But what about cases in which H and its competitors are consistent
with one another, but nonetheless compete in the sense of Competition (ii)? In
such a case, by chopping away at H’s competitors, explanatorily discriminating
evidence also precludes possible ways in which H could be true. So it’s not
background conditions specifying the proper setup of our experiment) given that the motion is
due to unobserved agitations of the fluid medium, but this result is highly unlikely (indeed, it is
nearly certain that it will not be observed) given that the motion is due to a vital force in organic
matter.
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obvious that RA will provide an effective strategy for confirming H in these
cases.
Allowing for the possibility that H and H0 are true together, we expand
Pr(H|E) in the following way:
Pr(H|E) = Pr(H&H0|E) + Pr(H&¬H0|E)
= Pr(H|E&H0)Pr(H0|E) + Pr(H|E&¬H0)Pr(¬H0|E) (2)
(2) represents Pr(H|E) as a weighted average of Pr(H|E&H0) and Pr(H|E&¬H0).
How do these compare to one another? Intuitively, in contexts of RA, the latter
of these terms would seem to be the greater, reflecting the idea that E better
supports H once competing hypotheses are ruled out.
Competition (ii) provides rational grounding for this intuition, revealing that
Pr(H|E&H0) < [or even⌧] Pr(H|E&¬H0). This condition implies Pr(H|E&H0) 
Pr(H|¬E&H0); i.e., Pr(H|E&H0) can be no greater than Pr(H|¬E&H0).14 But in
RAs, Pr(H|¬E&H0) will standardly be quite low indeed. This is the probability
our target hypothesis takes in the case that all of our past evidence proves false
and H’s competitor proves true (e.g., the probability that unobservable agitations
in fluid media cause Brownian motion conditional on us having repeatedly failed
to ever observe such motion in past experiments, and conditional on such motion
being attributable to a vital force in living matter). By contrast, Pr(H|E&¬H0)
– representing the probability of H in light of all past evidence, and without H0
standing in its way – can be considerable, and arguably high. Given these ob-
servations, Pr(H|E&¬H0) will typically provide a maximum cap (much greater
than Pr(H|E&H0)) on the value of Pr(H|E).
Pr(H|E&Rn) can also be expanded as follows:
Pr(H|E&Rn) = Pr(H&H0|E&Rn) + Pr(H&¬H0|E&Rn)
= Pr(H|E&Rn&H0)Pr(H0|E&Rn) + Pr(H|E&Rn&¬H0)Pr(¬H0|E&Rn)
Recall from the previous section that Discrimination, when coupled with Suc-
cess, entails that Pr(Rn|H0&E) ⇡ 0. Consequently, it follows that Pr(H0|E&Rn) ⇡
0 – and so Pr(¬H0|E&Rn) ⇡ 1.15 Discrimination thus again displays an elimina-






14This can easily be verified by stating the condition fully:
E(E,H|H0) = Pr(H|E&H
0)  Pr(H|¬E&H0)
Pr(H|E&H0) + Pr(H|¬E&H0)  0
15Given that Pr(H0|E&Rn) = Pr(H0&E)Pr(Rn|H0&E)/Pr(E&Rn).
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Does a successful increment of RA lend confirmation to H in these cases?
We may specify the conditions under which it does, in light of the above, by
comparing (2) and (3). Whether or not Pr(H|E&Rn) > Pr(H|E) comes down to
whether
Pr(H|E&Rn&¬H0) > Pr(H|E&H0)Pr(H0|E) + Pr(H|E&¬H0)Pr(¬H0|E). (4)
Recall that the right hand side of (4) is a weighted average of Pr(H|E&H0) and
Pr(H|E&¬H0), with a maximum cap value of Pr(H|E&¬H0). The strength of
inequality (4) can thus be determined by asking two questions: 1. How much (if
at all) greater than the right hand side’s maximum cap Pr(H|E&¬H0) is the left
hand side Pr(H|E&Rn&¬H0)? 2. How much (if at all) greater than the weighted
average is this average’s maximum cap – i.e., for fixed weights Pr(H0|E) and
Pr(¬H0|E), to what extent is Pr(H|E&¬H0) greater than Pr(H|E&H0)?
The degree to which Rn confirms H is thus determined by the strength of the
following two inequalities: Pr(H|E&¬H0) > Pr(H|E&H0) and Pr(H|E&Rn&¬H0) >
Pr(H|E&¬H0). This result can be intuitively interpreted and motivated. The first
of these inequalities explicates one’s judgment of how much more likely H is in
light of E when H0 is ruled out versus when H0 is true. One might describe this
as the evidential support that was previously not flowing from E to H due to the
presence of competitor H0. We have already noted above that Competition (ii)
gives us strong reason to think that this inequality will typically be quite signif-
icant indeed. The second inequality straightforwardly explicates the degree to
which the new detection Rn confirms H, in light of the past evidence and H0’s
being eliminated. The degree to which RA supports H in this case then is de-
termined by joining the support from past detections E that H0 was previously
cutting off from H to the additional support that Rn gives H in light of H0’s
elimination.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued against prevailing formal philosophical accounts of
RA-diversity, and associated accounts of RA. Paradigmatic cases of RA, taken
from the history of science, pose problems for views that require means of de-
tection cited in RAs to be diverse in various senses to do with probabilistic inde-
pendence.
In place of such accounts, I have developed a new explanatory account of
RA-diversity and of RA. This account is descriptively superior to previous ac-
counts, fitting nicely with actual cases of RA in the sciences. This account also
has the virtue of being generally applicable across various subspecies of RA. In
particular, I have suggested that the explanatory account of RA developed here
applies to model-based RAs just as well as it does to empirically-driven RAs.
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The explanatory account not only has these descriptive virtues, but when
combined with recent formal epistemological work on the logic of explanatory
power, it bears important normative fruit. There are at least two different senses
in which explanatory hypotheses compete in RAs. Our investigation into the
logic of RAs revealed that, in both cases, a successful increment of RA can indeed
confirm a target hypothesis H.
Moreover, this investigation illuminated the conditions under which such
confirmation occurs and the determinants of the degree to which the H is con-
firmed. In sum, we have found that, when RAs involve hypotheses that com-
pete as mutually exclusive options, H is incrementally confirmed by ruling out
possible ways that it could be false; and the extent to which it is confirmed is
determined by how plausible the competing hypothesis was and how well that
competitor fit the evidence pre-elimination.
When RAs instead involve consistent hypotheses that nonetheless provide
competing potential explanations, H is confirmed by ruling out possible ways
that H would lose its support from the evidence; and the extent to which it
is confirmed is determined by adding in the support that it was not getting
due to the presence of the competitor plus the support provided by the new,
explanatorily discriminating means of detection. In either case, when RA is aptly
described as a species of explanatory reasoning, its potential epistemic virtues
are made manifest.
RA constitutes an intuitively compelling strategy, prevalent in the theoretical
sciences, for constructing and confirming hypotheses. Philosophers of science
today disagree, however, on whether it actually carries any normative, confir-
matory power. The present work differs from recent accounts in its effort to
articulate precisely the notion of diversity as it appears in actual scientific appli-
cations of RA. Recently, philosophers of science have either rested content with a
vague (though still possibly somewhat informative) description of such diversity
(e.g., Weisberg’s description of such diversity as “sufficient heterogeneity”), or
they have too readily leaned on Bayesian accounts of evidential diversity that ul-
timately do not correspond to the notion called upon in actual RAs. Here, I have
developed a precise explanatory account of diversity, which I argue is descrip-
tively truer to scientific practice. Only then have I investigated RA’s acclaimed
normative merits. Our precise account of the relevant concept of diversity re-
veals that RA can indeed be substantially confirmatory under certain natural
conditions.
Appendix





Pr(H0|E&¬Rn) + Pr(H0|E&Rn) ⇡ 1.




Pr(E)Pr(Rn|E) ⇡ 0. (5)
Via Success, we are given that
E(E,H0) = Pr(H
0|E)  Pr(H0|¬E)
Pr(H0|E) + Pr(H0|¬E) > 0.










or equivalently, to the extent that Pr(E|H0) > Pr(E). For this result to be consis-
tent with (5) – so long as Pr(H0) 6⇡ 0, as we are assuming – it must be the case
that Pr(Rn|H0&E) ⇡ 0.
Starting from E(Rn,H|E) ⇡ 1 (which is also required byDiscrimination), one
may straightforwardly prove Pr(Rn|H&E) ⇡ 1 mutatis mutandis.
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